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Today in the global economy the importance of financial systems is 
more vulnerable than ever. To understand the situation and to find a solution 
for the current instability sometimes is good to look back in the history in order 
to find alternatives for avoiding or preventing the crisis. The focus of this paper 
is the analysis of the financial and debt crisis in small economies provoked 
from big economy actions trough the history, and their repeating in the present. 
The main objective is to set a model which shows that economic circles are 
leaking. The research results are presented in a consistent form. The conclusion 
emphasizes once again that the history comes again today, and that the present 
financial situation should be anticipated.  
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The historical data show that big increasements of the budgetary dept 
are mostly lead by sudden decreasements of the tax of gain and usually because 
of the big undertaken actions in the government spending in order to fight down 
the recession, the commercial costs are, in some cases relatively minor reason 
for post-financial crisis dept weights, and some of the financial crisis are called 
systematic financial crisis. Still, the modern financial crisis is severe to any 
measures. The last empirical researches focus on alternative evaluations of the 
crisis, especially on the crisis of the cash flows. Some authors, such as Frankel 
and Rose use a range of 105 countries for the period from 1970-1991 to 
conclude that the current account has no meaning in the crisis explanation. The 
authors Kaminski and Reinhart include implicitly the connection of the current 
account and the crisis of the cash flows including the rate of export and import 
growth in their analyses. These authors take the export-import rate as a relevant 
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factor for early warning of crisis. The warning is based on noise – to – signal 
ratio of the series being analyzed. Edwards’ analysis, on the other hand, shows 
that under some crisis definitions and partial exclusion of the African countries, 
the deficits of the current accounts are significant determinants for the 
probability of experiencing crisis. Razin and Rubinstein are focusing on the 
oscillation of the real monetary course to define the crises. Up to the point that 
many resent crises ware started through credit shocks on the international 
markets, the crises measurement is more connected with the size and 
unexpected transactions of the capital account, than with the size of the 
fluctuation  of the nominal cash flows or the current account turnover. Actually, 
the current account and the movement of the currency rate can be more 
influenced by the endogen social decisions than the systemic sudden stops – 3S. 
Systemic sudden stops means big and much unexpected contractions of the 
capital account that appear in periods of systemic turbulence and the importance 
of the effects on the balances and their materialization
1
. The systemic sudden 
stops are caused by numerous and big hexogen aggregate expansions and rate 
interest influences. Thus, the systemic sudden stops can appear in a partly 
different crises timing comparing to the currency rates or the capital account 
turnover.  
According to Radelet and Sachs, the financial crises can appear when 
there is a sharp overturn (decrease) in the net private foreign capital flows. With 
this definition, they do not aim to underline the “unexpected” component in the 
sudden stops and do not discriminate if the crises episodes are domestic or 
foreign. An indicator of the sudden stops can also be focused on the overturns 
of the capital account that coincides to a big increase of the aggregate 
expansions. This indicator is taken in consideration based on the need of 
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précising the crises connected with an extern stimulation, and the extern 
stimulation is systemic by nature, e.i. it refers to the systemic sudden stops. We 
should take in consideration that this defining of the 3C overturns of the capital 
account coincide with the decrease of the output, so there is a decrease of the 
influence of the domestic factors in the definition, which provides a focus on the 
extern background. 
Rothenberg and Warnock join Calvo, Izquierdo and Mejia in 2006 to 
explore the differences between the capital account turnovers originating from 
the capital flows transactions and their attribution to not residents vis а vis those 
attributed to residents. As the case in Chile, where most of the capital account 
balance  changes are caused by the changes of the brut flows strengthened by 
the residents. For the limited example of countries, they discovered that many of 
the capital flows net turnovers are due to transactions executed by foreigners. 
The next direction of this paper revises the crises initiated by foreign reasons. 
The terms big and unexpected are very significant and central for the sudden 
stops. Several conditions encounter the sudden stops in order to operationalize 
then and to look them as a phase. Those conditions are
2
: The stops consist at 
least one observation where year by year the decreases are relying on at least 
two standard deviations under the example (this refers to the “unexpected” 
sudden stop); The sudden stop phase ends when the yearly change of capital 
flows overpasses one standard deviation under the example. This will generally 
introduce consistency, which is a general fact about sudden stops; Furthermore, 
for the will of symmetry, the beginning of a sudden stop phase is determined by 
the first time of yearly change of decreased capital flows for one standard 
deviation under the example. Because of this, the sudden stop phase starts by 
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decreasing capital flows that overpass the standard deviation and are followed 
by the fall of two standard deviations, the process will last until the capital 
flows change is bigger than minus one standard deviation. This crises concept 
pretends including episodes that otherwise would not be qualified as crises 
when used as threshold measurements of current accounts’ fix deficit. In 
addition to this, later on many of the crises in the developed countries would be 
excluded simply because their variability and inconsistency is smaller. Monthly 
data are used to maximize the exact possibilities for timely discovery of the 
sudden stops episodes because of the data with smaller participation that can 
blur the beginning of the episodes. Determination of the exact timing of the 
these episodes is relevant because of the fact that the eventual changes of the 
real currency rate that can emerge from the potential closure of the current’s 
account deficit should be measured before the sudden stop taking place. If we 
consider that the information of the capital account of this type of interval 
(monthly) are unavailable, we get a construction of a capital flow approximate 
to the net trade balance from the changes in the foreign reserves. The changes of 
the 12 months cumulative measures of the capital flows are taken approximately 
on a year basis in order to avoid the season fluctuations.  If we continue with the 
statement that systemic unsudden stops (3C) or unsudden stops should be 
identified through hexogen defiant, in addition we have to look the discovery of 
unsudden stops that have periods of sudden increase of aggregate expansion. 
Thus, it is underlined that the big discovered changes in the capital flows are 
used for aggregate expansions, in order to discover the periods of turbulence of 
the capital market. This type of analyses are made on 110 countries (21 
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As we mentioned earlier, the actual financial crisis that begun in 2007 
and still lasting, it is predicted to take the biggest proportions known in the 
history of economy. Not only for that reason, but because the crises are 
repeating, it’s important to respond the question who is causing the crises, how 
are they are predicted, when and if they can be stopped and where does the 
regulation find its place in these responds. Many accusations about the actual 
crisis and the reasons for its appearance are also connecting with the political 
background, especially connected with the presidential elections in America in 
2008. The critics go especially to the republicans in America because of the 
support of the bank deregulation they considered to be necessary at that time 
due to the growth of the American economy. In 1999, an act was woted, known 
as “Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act“, which terminated the positions of the previous 
act, „Glass-Steagall Act“. Glass-Steagall Act is a part if the legislative of the big 
depression era that introduces and defines a number of regulations of the 
financial institutions. This act is adopted with compromise from both American 
parties. Still, it is considered that this act from 1999 didn’t cause the crisis, but 
on the other hand, it makes the crisis less rough and difficult than otherwise. 
The FED board that provided a dangerously speculative economy is considered 
to be more significant agent for the crisis. In 1998 it is decided that the 
commercial banks can undertake activities and from the investment banking 
when Citicorp regulators (commercial bank) let them to participate in the 
Traveler’s group (insurance company that was partly included in investment 
banking) and these two companies to form together Citigroup. With this act of 
the regulators it was actually announced the change of Glass-Steagall Act. As a 
reaction to this thesis appears the attitude that besides this, the deregulated 
banks are not the biggest offender for the current debacle. In time, Bank of 
Amerika, Citigroup, Wells Fargo and J.P.Morgan can thoroughly repair the 
financial crisis (if they are not attacked by it as well) and still exist on the 
market. Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were the institutions that stayed 
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independent despite the abolition of Glass-Steagall Act, and one of them 
collapsed, the other bankrupted. Even the deregulation was the reason that 
provided Bank of Amerika and J.P.Morgan to gain and buy Merrill Lynch and 
Bear Stearns, which allows them to fight better with the financial crisis and its 
consequences. However, the regulation infiltrates its components into the 
reasons for a beginning of the crisis from 2007. Currently, it has been especially 
revised the Federal Housing Enterprise Regulatory Reform Act from 2005 that 
turns to a unique independent regulatory body, the legislative for reorganization 
of the precaution and the supervision and independent agency for regulation of 
the two selected entities.    
If we take a different perspective, a place in the guilty list for the current 
crisis can also be appointed to the Federal reserve, domestic (American) buyers, 
the Congress, real-estate agents, Clinton’s administration, mortgage brokers, 
Alan Greenspan, Wall Street companies, Bush’s administration, unclear 
accounting rules, collective delusion. If we add the attitudes stating that the 
most guilty ones are the greedy participants of Wall Street, a big part of the guilt 
automatically comes down to the regulation which is especially weak in the part 
of the American mortgage market. The crisis from 2007 is also called failure 
“sinking in the frames of Titanic” for the regulation. Alan Greenspan, who ones 
held the title and reputation of an economist with a sense for the market 
conditions, now is numbered in the agents causing the crisis exactly because of 
the oversight he did with the regulation. He declares that “the borrowers are 
capable to evaluate on their own the risks of individual applicants” by which he 
only confirms his faith in the market forces and the unnecessary investments. 
Through Home Ownership Protection Act, FED was given authorization for 
regulation of the mortgage loans as well. Here the regulation and its minimalism 
are appearing as an agent of the crisis from 2007. Since Ben Bernanke has 
stepped as the head of FED, certain changes have been made in the regulative 
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measures with so-called “Regulation Z” that reply on the demand for a 
documentation to confirm the capability of the loan demanders to pay the dept. 
What are the proportions of the regulation during the expansions of the 
crisis in the other countries? For example, if we take England, a country with 
relatively stable financial system and a last banking downfall marked in 1878 
when City of Glasgow Bank and West of England & South Wales District Bank 
bankrupted, there is a question why this kind of system endures a dramatic fall 
or is that a question of implemented and present instability of the whole system. 
Even in this kind of system, the incompetence and the inadequacy of the 
regulation, as well as the poverty of the public elections lead to financial crises. 
Low interest rates followed by “unjustified” confidentiality in the economic 
system lead to systematic underrated risk. The entire situation and the 
permission for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to buy 44% of all high risk 
securities made the regulation not reacting effectively. Since 2002, in this 
country it is accentuated the little attention that Financial Services authority 
commits to the systematic risk. This is not caused because of the fact that the 
regulation of England is weak, it has even been estimated that the directing to 
the aspect of systematic risk costs 50% less than what was predicted, still the 
focus was put on concrete points, for account of the wider ensemble and the 
stability of the entire financial system. The internationality of the regulationg 
shows a moment of copying during the behavior. If the rules direct everyone to 
the same activity, then the reverse effect of the diversification makes the crises 
more similar and dangerous when they occur. The regulation of short-term 
hedge funds makes things more difficult for the banks because it directs them 
towards convertible bonds. 
The conclusion would be that the crises were and will be present. To 
answer the question where is their source we should look in several locations 
and act in the frames of the real and possible. Every single activity should be 
founded on real bases, but every single regulation should also be possibly 
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executable. The regulation has a big part in the beginning of the financial crisis. 
This part is not unique, but it’s enough important so that can be marked with 
implications for creating and developing circumstances favorable for 
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